CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Conceptual Framework

A research model shows the model of the research in the form of chart to describe the relation between the topic, problem, theoretical framework, and the result of the analysis observe the chart below.

**SPEECH ACT**

**THE THEORY OF EXPERTS:**
1. J. L. Austin
2. Joan Cutting
3. Victoria Fromkin
4. S. I. Hayakawa
5. Archibald Hill
6. Stephen Levinson
7. Geoffrey. N. Leech
8. Graham Lock
9. John Lyons
10. J Mey
12. Schiffer’s
13. Stephen Ullmann
14. S. K. Verma. & N. Krishnaswamy
15. George Yule

**SEARLE’S THEORY**

Identifying the types and the functions of Illocutionary Acts Found in the United Nations Spokesman Ban Ki Moon’s “Lecture at the

Conclusion from the Result of Research
The above chart constitutes a form describing the ways of thinking used to develop the theories of the experts. This chart can also be expected to help readers understand the research more easily. It is very important to avoid misunderstanding and bring away the research objective from its initial aim.

This research, will apply be taken Searle’s theory to identify the types and functions of text based on illocutionary acts. Then, it is applied to identify what types and functions of illocutionary acts are more dominant in the United Nations Spokesman Ban Ki Moon’s “Lecture at the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre” Text. The theories of all experts found in the chart are used to support the being observed.

### 2.1.1 Speech Acts Theories

Usually, someone who is reading the script of a speech does not only try to understand the meaning of sentences used literally but also try to understand what the writer of the script of the speech really means. The branch of linguistics which studies about the meaning that is wanted by speaker is called Pragmatics (George Yule, 1985: 97). Pragmatically, a good speech act will occur when a listener understands what the speaker means and the listener will do something that is suitable with the speaker wants. Lock Graham (1996: 175) states that we also use language to exchange services to get people to do things and to offer to do things ourselves.

Levinson (1983: 5) make some definitions concerning pragmatics as given below.
1. Pragmatics is the study of those principles that will account for why a certain set of sentences are anomalous, or not possible utterances, Levinson (1983: 6).

2. Pragmatics is the study of language from a functional perspective, that is, that it attempts to explain facets of linguistic structure by reference to non-linguistic pressures and causes, Levinson (1983: 7).

3. Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of a language, Levinson (1983: 9).

4. Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic theory, Levinson (1983: 12).

5. Pragmatics is the study of the relations between language and context that are basic to an account of language understanding Levinson (1983: 21).

6. Pragmatics is the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with contexts in which they would be appropriate, Levinson (1983: 24).

7. Pragmatics is the study of deixis (at least in part), implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and aspects of discourse structure, Levinson (1983: 27).

It has been stated, that pragmatics can not be separated from speech act theory which becomes a basic in comprehending or interpreting the certain meaning of utterances or sentences. The speaker who wants to say something must do it with clear utterances. Sometimes, there are people who speak so fast that the listener is very difficult to understand what the speakers mean. It is the same cases when a listener hears the utterances from electronic media.

The listener who wants to know the instruction from a speaker through electronic media will face the trouble if the sound pronounced is unclear. It is
supported by Archibald Hill (1969: 235) states that in such a recording, the sound waves of speech are simply changed to a permanent form, from which the original sound waves can be re-created at any time. The listener will have the different meaning and action if the sound of electronic media or organs of speaking is not good enough.

S. K. Verma and N Krishnaswamy (1989: 315) state that pragmatics has moved the focus from language as an abstract formal system to its communicative and functional aspects. It means that pragmatic does not only discuss about the linguistic meaning but also discuss about the use of statements or sentences to persuade other people to do something.

Furthermore, John Lyons (1995: 247) states that saying is doing. Saying in this sense involves three different kinds of doing such as the act of producing an inscription, the act of composing a sentence, the act of contextualizing that sentence.

These components are important before the speaker begins to say something in order to be able to produce the sequences of the utterances and to have some identifiable and meaningful language signals. Whether one asserts or merely suggests, promises or merely indicates an intention, or persuades or merely argues, depends not only on the literal meaning of one’s words, but also on what one intends to do with them, and the institutional and social setting in which the linguistic activity occurs.

S. I. Hayakawa (1978: 159) states that when the speaker says something, listener must be understand what to do and what to observe in order to bring the
thing defined or its effect within the range of one’s experience. From this statement, it can be meant that an action must be appropriate to the object, what the speakers mean from their utterances. For example, when the speaker says “Where’s your necklace Tina?” it may cause that tina will touch her neck quickly or she might respond it as “Oh, I put it in the drawer”. It can be seen that the listener directly shows her neck and tries to take the necklace or give some responses to the speaker. She does not show other thing but directly the object what the speaker means in his/her statement.

Austin emphasized the importance of social fact and convention in doing things with words, in particular with respect to the class of speech act known as *illocutionary acts*. Austin began by distinguishing between what he called “constantives” and “performatives”. A constantive is simply saying something true or false. While a performative is doing something by speaking; paradigmatically, one can get married by saying “I do” (Austin, 1962: 5).

Constantives are true or false, depending on their correspondence (or not) with the facts; performatives are reactions and, as such, are not true or false, but “felicitous” or “infelicitous”, depending on whether or not they successfully perform the action in question. Victoria Fromkin (2007: 175) states that verbs like *bet, promise, warn*, and so on are performative verbs.

Austin’s student, John R. Searle (1969: 64) developed speech act theory as a theory of the constitutive rules for performing illocutionary acts, i.e., the rules that tell what perform (successfully) an illocutionary act (with certain illocutionary force and certain propositional content). The rules are classified as
propositional content rules which put conditions on the propositional content of some illocutionary acts; preparatory rules which tell what the speaker will imply in the performance of the illocutionary acts; sincerity rules that tell what psychological state the speaker expresses to be in; and essential rules which tell us what the action consists in essentially.

2.1.2 Types of Speech Acts


2.1.2.1 Locutionary Act

Locutionary act is semantic or literal meaning of a sentence. According to Austin, the interpretation of locutionary act is concerned with meaning. In other words, a locutionary act is an act of producing a meaningful linguistic expression. Briefly, locutionary act is the literal meaning of what a speaker says. For example, if someone says “Switch on the light!” it can be meant that the speaker wants someone else to switch on the lamp on. In other word, saying the sentence “Switch on the light!” is a locutionary act if a listener understands each of the words switch, on, the, light and can identity the particular light referred to

2.1.2.2 Illocutionary Act

Illocutionary act is the act of saying a sentence, which is committed and intended by a as an order or a piece of advice, as a promise, as a ask, as a state, as a question, as a order, as a apologizing, as a threat, and as a request. According to
Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we do something", as when a minister joins two people in a marriage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife."

Illocutionary act is a technical term in linguistics introduced by the philosopher John L. Austin in his investigations concerning various aspects of speech acts. According to his original exposition in “How to Do Things with Words” (1985: 12), an illocutionary act is an act (a) for the performance of which a speaker must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed and (b) the performance of which illocutinary acts have to do with understanding they a involves the production of what Austin call “conventional consequences” as e.g., rights, commitments, or obligations. Therefore, for example, in order to successfully perform a promise, a speaker must make clear to his or her audience that the promise occurs, and undertake an obligation to do the promised thing, hence, promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense.

However, for certain reasons, among them known as insufficient knowledge of Austin's original exposition, the term illocutionary act is nowadays understood in a number of other ways. Furthermore, Searle (1974: 167) says that a speaker you can only perform an illocutionary act by saying that he or she is performing it, for the deep structure of every sentence he or she utters contains "an explicitly represented perfor main verb."

It is also often emphasized that Austin introduces the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other kinds of acts: the illocutionary act, he says,
is an act performed in saying something as contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying something which is meaningful and can be understood, the act as the result or effect produced by means of by saying something.

Any particular speech event may have any combination of locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary effects. For example, when a speaker says “Shoot the beast!”, it can have locutionary meaning, illocutionary meaning or perlocutionary meaning. In other words, it can be meant that the speaker wants the listener to shoot the beast referred to, to mean it as an order or to mean it as a persuasion (locutionary act), the meaning of ‘shoot’ referring to her, then, he urged (or advised, ordered, etc) me to shoot her (illocutionary act) and he persuaded me to shoot her. Still another conception of an illocutionary act goes back to Schiffer's famous book “Meaning” (1972: 103), in which the illocutionary act is represented as just the act of meaning something.

According to Searle (1969: 58), the illocutionary act is an act performed in saying something and a force indicating devices for commitment. For example, when a speaker says to a listener “I promise” and “I hereby promise”, there is a strong difference inbetween them. The sentence “I hereby promise” will have a stronger meaning, and the listener will be more convinced to the speaker’s utterance.

In this case the illocutionary act forces someone to fulfill or do something that is suitable to the speaker expressions. In other words, Illocutionary act can be defined as using a sentence to perform a function. The speaker who is saying something, he or she may perform some functions of act through the utterances
such as requesting, complaining, promising, asking, stating, ordering, apologizing, threatening, and questioning. George Yule (1996: 48) adds that the illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. According to the Stephen Ullmann (1962: 198), an Illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, it can be transferred to another simply because they occur together in many context. The illocutionary act as the act of doing something from utterances, the speaker must be known about the context also, in order the communication can be occured and be connected to the listener.

2.1.2.3 Perlocutionary Act

Perlocutionary act is the expected effect on the hearer by uttering the sentence. In uttering a sentence or an utterance the speaker expects that the hearer will achieve an effect. For example: If someone says “Where’s your necklace?” it may causes you touch your neck quickly or you might respond ‘Oh, I put it in the drawer’.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Types of Illocutionary Acts

It has been mentioned in conceptual framework that this research will be done by using Searle’s theory. He is Austin’s student who discussed the next theory about speech act. There are many assumptions that have been given by Searle. He make some clear terms concerning the types of illocutionary act. He devides the types of illocutionary act to the functions of illocutionary acts, but Austin in his book “How to do thing with word” (1962) does not give them.
Austin (1962: 150) tentatively proposed illocutionary acts into five major classes. They are as follow:

1. Verdictives: Typified by giving a verdict by a jury, an arbitrator or an umpire. For example, through the uses of the verbs acquit, grade, estimate, and diagnose.
2. Exercitives: The Exercising powers, rights or influence. For example, through the uses of verbs appoint, order, advise, and wary.
3. Commissives: Including declarations or announcement of intention. For example, through the uses of verbs promise, guarantee, bet, and oppose.
4. Behabitives: Concerning attitudes and social behavior. For example, through the uses of verbs apologize, criticize, bless, and challenge.
5. Expositives: Clarifying how utterances fit into ongoing discourse or how they are being used. For example, through the uses of the verbs argue, postulate, affirm, and concede.

Searle (1985: 52) categorized illocutionary acts into five types, that is, assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative.

1. Assertive: Speech act which describes states or events in the world. In uttering assertive, the speaker conveys his or her belief that some proposition is true. So it can be judged for truth-value. It can be uttered in a form of claim, report, statement, and description. For example, when someone reports “Honda is Japan’s automotive product”, he conveys his belief that the proposition “Honda is Japan’s product” is true and describes Honda as Japan’s product as a state or event in the world.
2. Directive: Speech act that is to cause the hearer to take a particular action, such as requests, commands and advice. By ordering, advising, requesting, commanding, begging, challenging, or pleading, the speaker is trying to get the listener to carry out some action. Ex: “Could you give me money please?”
3. Commisive: Speech act that commits a speaker to some future action, such as promise and oaths. By uttering a commisive, the speaker shows commitments of himself to do some future course of action. Commisive can be uttered in the form of promise, guarantees, contracts, threat, and other types of commitments for example ‘If you don’t stop talking, I will shut your mouth’. The speaker is committing himself to shut the hearer mouth if he (the hearer) does not stop talking”.
4. Expressive: Speech act that expresses on the speaker’s attitude and emotions towards the proposition, such as congratulation, excuses, and thanks. For example, when someone uttered an utterance such as ‘Happy anniversary,
mom’ the speaker wants to express his / her feeling of her mother’s anniversary.

5. Declarative: Speech act that changes the reality in accord with the preposition of the declaration, such as baptism, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife. For example, when someone says “You’re fired”, it can be meant that he is declaring someone’s job to be terminated.

Here, Searle’s theory is chosen because it is more critical and practical than Austin’s theory. In Austin’s theory, there is no clear consistent principle or set of principle on the basis of which the term is constructed. It is added here that Searle developed Austin’s theory and improved it.

2.2.2 The Functions of Illocutionary Acts

In speech acts investigation, the illocutionary act often becomes is the main focus of discussion because it is concerned with the intended meaning of utterance or the sentences spoken. Besides, there are various functions of the illocutionary acts that need to be known. Searle in Leech (1983: 105) states that at most general level, the illocutionary act may be classified into four functions and they may be described below.

1. Competitive: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal, such as, ordering, asking, demanding, and begging. In this function, the negative politeness is used to reduce an unpleasant way between what the speakers want in saying politeness.

2. Convivial: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal, such as offering, inviting, greeting, thanking, and congratulating. In this context, the politeness is utilized positively to make a pleasure relationship to the society.

3. Collaborative: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal, such as asserting, reporting, and instructing. This function does not contain politeness.

4. Conflictive: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal, such as threatening, accusing, refusing, and reprimanding. It is against politeness that is not at all since it is purposed to show the anger, except in the irony sentence.
It can be concluded that assertives belong to collaborative category, directives belong to the competitive category, commissives tend to be conflictive, and expressive stand to be convivial. Declarative does not include to other functions as mentioned above. Declarative is a very special category of speech acts; they are performed, normally speaking, by someone who is especially authorized to do so within some institutional framework, as institutional rather than personal act. For example, judges in sentencing offenders, ministers of religion in christening babies, dignitaries in naming ships, and so on.

2.3 Previous Related Studies

Several studies on illocutionary acts have been done previously. For example, Aini (2007) looks at “Sign Language of Hellen Keller in Miracle Worker Movie”. Aini investigates the way Hellen Keller used a sign language through language acquisition theory. The researcher finds out some difficulties on spelling verbs for the deaf-blind person. Hellen Keller, the main character in the “Miracle Worker” movie, acquired her language as follow is by hands-on signing and using sign language. Thus, the similarity between this research and Aini’s research lies on same discussion about illocutionary act expressed and the difference lies on the object and the theory used.

In her research, the theory of Searle’s illocutionary acts is applied and thus, she used language acquisition theory social purposes: competitive, convivial, collaborative and conflictive. Wildan (2008) who researches “A Study on Illocutionary Acts Used by the Main Characters in The Boor” finds the the main characters in “The Boor” the types of illocutionary act, such as directives,
assertives, commissives, expressives and declaratives. Wildan didn’t discuss about the functions of illocutionary acts as done in this research.

This research investigates illocutionary acts expressed in Chairman of the United Nation Ban Ki Moon’s Speech, that is, to analyze the data, concerning illocutionary acts theory proposed by Searle: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative.