CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 An Overview of Pragmatic Theory

Pragmatics theory explains the reason or opinion of the speaker and listener in arranging the correlation between the contexts of a sentence and a proposition (planning or problem). In this case pragmatic theory represents a part of performance. Morris (1938:6) in Tarigan (1990:33) states that pragmatics is an analysis about “the relation between signs and interpreters”.

Pragmatics is an analysis about the relation between language and context which is encoded in a structure of language. It is also analyzing the relation between language and contexts which is representing foundation for a record or report of understanding language, equally a study about language user’s ability to connect and make compatible sentences and contexts precisely.

Pragmatics analyzes the certain utterance in certain situation. It focuses on the various ways particularly. Those way represent a place of various social contexts of language performs which can influence the explanation or interpretation. Pragmatics not only analyzes the supra segmental influences, dialect and register, but also looks into the performance of utterance, for the first as social activity that is arranged by various social convention.

Pragmatics analyzes entirety mankind’s behavioural, especially in its relation with signs and devices. Pragmatics focuses on the way of mankind behave giving and taking sign in entirety situation.
Yule (1996:3) states that there are four areas that pragmatics are concerned with. To understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its relationship with other area of linguistic analysis.

1. Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. Pragmatic is the study of speaker meaning.

2. This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speaker organize what they want to say in accordance with who they are talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances. Pragmatic is the study of contextual meaning.

3. This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation of invisible meaning. Pragmatic is the study of how more meaning gets communicated than it said.

4. This perspective than raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tried to the notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is,
speakers determine how much needs to be said. *Pragmatic is the study of the expression of relative distance.*

### 2.1.1 The Understanding of Pragmatic Theory

Pragmatics is a subfield of linguistics which studies the ways in which context contributes to meaning. Pragmatics encompasses speech act theory, conversational implicature, talk in interaction and other approaches to language behaviour in philosophy, sociology, and linguistics. It studies how the transmission of meaning depends not only on the linguistic knowledge (e.g. grammar, lexical, etc.) of the speaker and listener, but also on the context of the utterance, knowledge about the status of those involved, the inferred intent of the speaker, and so on. In this respect, pragmatics explains how language users are able to overcome apparent ambiguity, since meaning relies on the manner, place, and time of an utterance.

The sentence "You have a green light" is ambiguous. Without knowing the context, the identity of the speaker, and their intent, it is not possible to infer the meaning with confidence. For examples:

- It could mean you are holding a green light bulb.
- Or that you have a green light to drive your car.
- Or it could be indicating that you can go ahead with the project.
- Or that your body has a green glow.

Similarly, the sentence "Sherlock saw the man with binoculars" could mean that Sherlock observed the man by using binoculars; or it could mean that
Sherlock observed a man who was holding binoculars. The meaning of the sentence depends on an understanding of the context and the speaker's intent.

Crystal (1987:120) in Peccei (1999:7) states, “Pragmatics studies the factors that govern our choice of language in social interaction and the effects of our choice on others.”

Pragmatics is a systematic way of explaining language use in context. It seeks to explain aspects of meaning which cannot be found in the plain sense of words or structures, as explained by semantics. Pragmatics is an important area of study for a course. A simplified way of thinking about pragmatics is to recognise, for example, that language needs to be kept interesting - a speaker or writer does not want to bore a listener or reader, for example, by being over-long or tedious. So, humans strive to find linguistic means to make a text, perhaps, shorter, more interesting, more relevant, more purposeful or more personal. Pragmatics allows this.

2.1.2 The Goals of Pragmatic Theory

Pragmatics is the study of the aspects of meaning and language use that are dependent on the speaker, the addressee. Pragmatics is a way of investigating how sense can be made of certain texts even when, from a semantic viewpoint, the text seems to be either incomplete or to have a different meaning to what is really intended. Consider a sign seen in a children's wear shop window: “Baby Sale - lots of bargains”. We know without asking that there are no babies are for sale - that what is for sale are items used for babies. Pragmatics allows us to investigate how this “meaning beyond the words” can be understood without ambiguity. The extra meaning is there, not because of the semantic aspects of the words
themselves, but because we share certain contextual knowledge with the writer or speaker of the text.

What does pragmatics have to offer that cannot be found in good old-fashioned linguistics? What do pragmatic methods give us in the way of greater understanding of how the human mind works, how humans communicate, how they manipulate one another, and in general, how they use language?

The general answer is pragmatics is needed if we want a fuller, deeper, and generally more reasonable account of human language behaviour.

A more practical answer would be: outside of pragmatics, no understanding; sometimes, a pragmatic account is the only one that makes sense, as in the following examples, borrowed from David Lodge's *Paradise News* (1992:65) in Smith (2006:16):

'I just met the old Irishman and his son, coming out of the toilet.'

'I wouldn't have thought there was room for the two of them.'

'No silly, I mean I was coming out of the toilet. They were waiting.'

How do we know what the first speaker meant? Linguists usually say that the first sentence is ambiguous. In order to show what is meant by 'ambiguous': a word, phrase, or sentence that can mean either one or the other of two (or even several) things.

For a pragmatician, this is of course, glorious nonsense. In real life, that is, among real language users, there is no such thing as ambiguity—excepting certain, rather special occasions, on which one tries to deceive one's partner or 'keep a door open.'
2.1.3 Theoretical Framework

In completing this thesis, the writer uses some theories which are relevant to the basic principle of this analysis.

Austin (1975:123) introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other kinds of acts, or aspects of acting: the illocutionary act is an act performed in saying something, as contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying something, and also contrasted with a perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something.

Further Austin (1975:125) said "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we do something", as when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." It means a minister declares that now the two people are husband and wife.

Searle (1997:10-16) in Saeed (1997:212) categorizes illocutionary acts into five main categories, they are: representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations.

- Representatives: here the speaker asserts a proposition to be true, using such verbs as affirm, believe, conclude, deny, and report.
- Directives: here the speaker tries to make the hearer do something, with such words as ask, beg, challenge, command, dare, invite, insist, and request.
- Commissives: here the speaker commits himself/herself to a (future) course of action, with verbs such as guarantee, pledge, promise, swear, vow, undertake, and warrant.
• Expressives: the speaker expresses an attitude to or about a state of affairs, using such verbs as apologize, appreciate, congratulate, deplore, detest, regret, thank, and welcome.

• Declarations: the speaker alters the external status or condition of an object or situation, solely by making the utterance, with verbs such as pronounce, declare, and baptism.

An utterance may have more than one illocutionary act. So, to make it be clearer, it is essential to insert the performative verb that shows the intention of an utterance. Austin in Saeed (1997:209-210), stated performative verb is a verb that explicitly names the speech act. He continued that performative utterance can be classified into: (1) explicit performative is a speech act containing a performative verb, and (2) implicit performative is a speech act without a performative verb. For example, “I declare that King Charles II was a coward” is an explicit performative utterance of declaring.

In an utterance, illocutionary acts can be performed in two ways, direct and indirect illocutionary act (Hurford & Heasley, 1983:259). Direct illocutionary act is an illocutionary act in which only the illocutionary force and propositional content literally expressed by the lexical items and syntactic form of the utterance are communicated.

While, Indirect illocutionary act is an illocutionary act in which the speaker expresses another illocutionary force other than that literally expressed in the utterance, by relying on, shared background knowledge principles of conversation such as the cooperative principle convention and the ability of the addressee to make inferences. For example, the direct illocutionary of, “Can you
pass the salt, please?” is an enquiry about the hearer’s ability to pass the salt. The indirect illocutionary is a request to the hearer to pass the salt.

2.2 Speech Act

Speech act is a technical term in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Speech acts can be analysed on three levels: illocutionary act, the performance of an utterance: the actual utterance and its ostensible meaning, comprising phonetic, phatic and rhetoric acts corresponding to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance; an illocutionary act: the semantic 'illocutionary force' of the utterance, thus its real, intended meaning; and in certain cases a further perlocutionary act: its actual effect, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not (Austin, 1975:3).

Many scholars identify 'speech acts' with illocutionary acts, rather than locutionary or perlocutionary acts. As with the notion of illocutionary acts, there are different opinions on the nature of speech acts.

We perform speech acts when we offer an apology, greeting, request, complaint, invitation, compliment, or refusal. A speech act is an utterance that serves a function in communication. A speech act might contain just one word, as in "Sorry!" to perform an apology, or several words or sentences: ‘I’m very sorry that I caused her to faint,’ said Charles Darnay (Dickens, 1979:26). Speech acts include real-life interactions and require not only knowledge of the language but also appropriate use of that language within a given culture.
We use language all the time to make things happen. We ask someone to pass the salt or marry us - not usually at the same time. We order a pizza or make a dental appointment. Speech acts include asking for a glass of beer, promising to drink the beer, threatening to drink more beer, ordering someone else to drink some beer, and so on. Some special people can do extraordinary things with words, like baptizing a baby, declaring war, awarding a penalty kick to Arsenal FC or sentencing a convict.

Linguists have called these things “speech acts” and developed a theory (called, unsurprisingly, “speech act theory”) to explain how they work.

Speech act theory broadly explains these utterances as having three parts or aspects: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.

Austin in Saeed (1997:211) proposed that communicating a speech act consists of three elements: the speaker says something, the speaker signals an associated speech act, and the speech act causes an effect on her listeners or the participants.

1. Locutionary act, by which meant as the act of saying something that makes sense in a language, i.e. follows the rules of pronunciation and grammar.
2. Illocutionary act, the action intended by the speaker, or the uses to which language can be put in society.
3. Perlocutionary act concerned with what follows an utterance: the effect or ‘take-up’ of an illocutionary act.

According to Yule (1996:48), on any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three related acts.
1. Locutionary act, as the basic act of utterance, or producing a meaningful linguistic expression.

2. Illocutionary act, an act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance.

3. Perlocutionary act, as a simply create an utterance with a function without intending it to have an effect.

2.2.1 Locutionary Act

Locutionary act is an act of saying something (the locution) with a certain meaning in traditional sense. This may not constitute a speech act.

Two types of locutionary act are utterance acts, where something is said (or a sound is made) and which may not have any meaning, and propositional acts, where a particular reference is made. (Note: acts are sometimes also called utterances - thus a locutionary act is the same a locutionary utterance).

Examples:

1. *Oh!* - is an utterance (note that communication is not intended - it is just a sound caused by surprise).
2. *The black cat* - is a propositional act (something is referenced, but no communication may be intended).

Communication is successful not when hearers recognize the linguistic meaning of the utterance, but when they infer the speaker's "meaning" from it (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:23).

Making a normal utterance involves a hierarchy of acts. To begin with, there is the act of utterance. We recognize utterance acts, even in a language that is completely unknown to us, in which we cannot distinguish the sentences used, and what speaker's message is. We do this on the basis of brute perception: by
hearing the utterance spoken, seeing it signed or written, or feeling it impressed in Braille. Linguistics is concerned with utterances in which speaker uses a language expression and thereby performs a locutionary act (and more).

Austin (1975:109), whose *How to Do Things with Words* first awakened wide interest in speech acts, included the act of referring as part of the locutionary act, and they were first separated by Searle in *Speech Acts* (1969:81). Whereas locutions are defined on a particular language, reference is defined on particular worlds.

Obviously, under normal conditions of use, speaker makes an utterance, uses a locution, and refers with it, all at one and the same moment.

### 2.2.2 Illocutionary Act

An *illocutionary* act is a complete speech act, made in a typical utterance, that consists of the delivery of the propositional content of the utterance (including references and a predicate), and a particular illocutionary force, whereby the speaker asserts, suggests, demands, promises, or vows as has stated before.

*Illocutionary act* is the *performance* of an act in saying something (vs. the general act of saying something). The *illocutionary force* is the speaker's intent, e.g. informing, ordering, warning, and undertaking. The illocutionary act carried out by a speaker making an utterance is the act viewed in terms of the utterance’s significance within a conventional system of social interaction, e.g. saying: ‘I am much better now,’ answered Darnay. ‘I’m not sure what time it is, or where I am, but I feel as if I am in the world.’ That utterance performs the illocutionary act of thanking.
The most significant act in the hierarchy of speaking is the illocutionary act. Austin (1975:110) alerted us to the fact that speaker does something in uttering to hearer in context C, e.g. states a fact or an opinion ‘I think I do feel faint,’ said Darnay (p. 28), confirms or denies something ‘No,’ answered Miss Manette (p. 69), apologizing ‘Gentlemen,’ I said, ‘pardon me, but I usually ask who needs my help’ (p. 89), a promise ‘I promise this, and I want you to remember it. ...’ (p. 48), a request ‘Doesn’t any of your dream remain?’ asked Miss Manette (p. 47), an asking or commanding ‘I asked you to believed that you could be better, Mr. Carton,’ said Miss Manette (p. 47).

In utterance, speaker performs an illocutionary act in using a particular locution to refer, such that utterance has the illocutionary force of a statement, a confirmation, a denial, a prediction, a promise, a request, and so forth.

We shall see later that an utterance has more than one illocutionary force; but many utterances have only one message to convey, and this particular illocutionary force is the illocutionary point. In (1), the locution can see in the following example.

1. I'll make the tea.

The person who utters it and the context of utterance will determine the reference. One illocutionary force is that of a statement about a future act. In a given utterance of (1), it may be used with a second illocutionary force: to make a promise. If this is the recognized intention of speaker, then that promise is the illocutionary point of the utterance. (There is a more detailed account of this process later.)
The illocutionary point of (2) would typically be to have hearer recognize that speaker is offering a bet; the acceptance or refusal of the challenge is the *perlocutionary effect* of the utterance.

2. *I bet you a dollar you can jump that puddle.*

An elementary illocutionary act is an illocutionary act that:

- does not have a negated illocutionary force,
- is not performed conditionally and
- is not conjoined to another illocutionary act.

### 2.2.2.1 The Categories of Illocutionary Act

Searle (1969:68-70) has set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts:

- **Representatives** are speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition, e.g. reciting a creed.
- **Directives** are speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands, and advice.
- **Commissives** are speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action, e.g. promises and oaths.
- **Expressives** are speech acts that express the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks.
- **Declarations** are speech acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife.
One general categories system list five types of general functions performed by speech acts: declaration, representatives, expressive, directives, and commissives.

**Declarations** are those kinds of speech acts that change the world via their utterance. As the examples in (1) illustrate, the speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific context, in order to perform a declaration appropriately.

1. a. Priest : I now pronounce you husband and wife.  
    b. Referee : You’re out!  
    c. Jury Foreman : we find the defendant guilty.

In using a declaration, the speaker changes the world via words.

**Representatives** are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be the case or not. Statements of fact, assertions, conclusions, and descriptions, as illustrated in (2), are all examples of the speaker representing the world as he or she believes it is.

2. a. The earth is flat.
    b. Chomsky didn’t write about peanuts.
    c. It was a warm sunny day.

In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief).

**Expressive** are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow. As illustrated in (3), they can be caused by something the speaker does or the hearer does, but they are about the speaker’s experience.

3. a. I’m really sorry!  
    b. Congratulations!  
    c. Oh, yes, great, mmmm, ssahh!

In using an expressive, the speaker makes words fit the world (of feeling).
**Directives** are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to do something. They express what the speaker wants. They are commands, orders, requests, suggestions, and as illustrated in (4), they can be positive or negative.

4. a. Give me a cup of coffee. Make it black.
   b. Could you lend me a pen, please?
   c. Do not touch that.

In using a directive, the speaker attempts to make the world fit the words (via the hearer).

**Commissives** are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to commit themselves to some future action. They express what the speaker intends. They are promises, threats, refusals, pledges, and, as shown in (5), they can be performed by the speaker alone, or by the speaker as a member of a group.

5. a. I will be back.
   b. I’m going to get it right next time.
   c. We will not do that.

In using a commissive, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words (via the speaker).

These five general functions of speech acts, with their key features, are summarized in Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech act type</th>
<th>Direction of fit</th>
<th>S= speaker; X= situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>Words change the world</td>
<td>S causes X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Make words fit the world</td>
<td>S believes X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Make words fit the world</td>
<td>S feels X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directives</td>
<td>Make the world fit words</td>
<td>S wants X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissives</td>
<td>Make the world fit words</td>
<td>S intends X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 *The five general functions of speech acts (following Searle 1979)*
2.2.2 Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID)

The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force (the *Illocutionary Force Indicating Device, or IFID*) is an expression of the type of shown in (1) where here is a slot for a verb that explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed. Such a verb can be called a **performative verb (Vp)**.

1. … ,‘ said Lucie. ‘…. I am asking you to use your power to help my husband and not to use it against him.’ (p. 77)
2. shouted Mr. Lorry. ‘…. I promise that I have not heard anything about Charles.’ (p. 74)
3. “’Gentlement,” I answered “I am that doctor.’ (p. 88)

In the (1, 2, and 3), ‘asking’, ‘promise’ and ‘answered’ would be the performative verb and, if stated, would be very clear IFIDs. Speakers do not always ‘perform’ their speech acts so explicitly, but they sometimes describe the speech act being performed. Imagine the telephone conversation in (4), between a man trying to contact Mary, and Mary’s friend.

4. Him : Can I talk to Mary?
   Her : No, she is not here.
   Him : I’m asking you—can I talk to her?
   Her : And I’m telling you—she’s not here!

In this scenario, each speaker has described, and drawn attention to, the illocutionary force (‘ask’ and ‘tell’) of their utterances.

Most of the time, however, there is no performative verb mentioned. Other IFIDs which can be identified are word order, stress, and intonation, as shown in the different version of the same basic elements (You are going) in (5).
5.  a. You’re going! (I tell you “You are going”)
    b. You’re going? (I request confirmation about “You are going”)
    c. Are you going? (I ask you if “You are going”)

While other devices, such as a lowered voice quality for a warning or a threat, might be used to indicate illocutionary force, the utterance also has to be produced under certain conventional conditions to count as having the intended illocutionary force.

Searle (1969:98) often speaks about what they call 'illocutionary force indicating devices' (IFIDs). These are supposed to be elements, or aspects of linguistic devices which indicate either (dependent on which conceptions of "illocutionary force" and "illocutionary act" are adopted) that the utterance is made with certain illocutionary force, or else that it constitutes the performance of a certain illocutionary act. In English, for example, the interrogative mood is supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a question; the directive mood indicates that the utterance is (intended as) a directive illocutionary act (an order, a request, etc.); the words "I promise" are supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a promise. Possible IFIDs in English include: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs.

2.2.2.3 Performative Utterance

One way to think about the speech acts being performed via utterance is to assume that underlying every utterance (U) there is a clause, similar to (2) presented earlier, containing a performative verb (Vp) which makes the
illocutionary force explicit. This is known as the *performative utterance* and the basic format of the underlying clause is shown in (7).

7.  I (hereby) Vp (that) I (U)

In this clause, the subject must be first person singular (‘I’), followed by the adverb ‘hereby’, indicating that the utterance “counts as” an action by being uttered. There is also a performative verb (Vp) in the present tense and an indirect object in first person singular (‘I’). This underlying clause will always make explicit, as in (8b.) and (9b.), what in utterances such as (8a.) and (9a.) are implicit.

8.  a. Clean up this mess!
    b. I hereby *order* you that you clean up this mess.
9.  a. The work was done by Elaine and myself.
    b. I hereby *tell* you that the work was done by Elaine and myself.

Examples like (8b.) and (9b.) (normally without ‘hereby’), are used by speakers as *explicit performatives*. Examples like (8a.) and (9a.) are *implicit performatives*, sometimes called *primary performatives*.

The advantage of this type of analysis is that it makes clear just what elements are involved in the production and interpretation of utterances. In syntax, a reflexive pronoun like ‘myself’ in (9) requires the occurrence of an antecedent (in this case ‘I’) within the same sentence structure. The explicit performative in (9b.) provides the ‘I’ element. Similarly when the speaker says to someone, ‘Do it yourself!’, the reflexive in ‘yourself’ is made possible by the antecedent ‘you’ in the explicit version (‘I order you that you do it yourself’). Another advantage is to show that some adverbs such as ‘honestly’, or adverbial clauses such as ‘because I may be late’, as shown in (10), naturally attach to the explicit performative clause rather than the implicit version.
10. a. Honestly, he’s a scoundrel.
   b. What time is it, because I may be late?

In (10a.) it is the telling part (the performative verb) that is being done ‘honestly’ and in (10b.), it is the act of asking (the performative again) that is being justified by the ‘because I may be late’ clause.

There are some technical disadvantages to the performative hypothesis. For example, uttering the explicit performative version of a command (8b.) has a much more serious impact than uttering the implicit version (8a.). The two versions are consequently not equivalent. It is also difficult to know exactly what the performative verb (or verbs) might be for some utterances. Although the speaker and hearer might recognize the utterance in (11a.) as an insult, it would be very strange to have (11b.) as an explicit version.

11. a. You’re dumber than a rock.
    b. I hereby insult you that you’re dumber than a rock.

The really practical problem with any analysis based on identifying explicit performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not know how many performative verbs there are in any language. Instead of trying to list all the possible explicit performatives, and then distinguish among all of them, some more general categories of types of speech acts are usually used as presented earlier.

2.2.2.4 Direct and Indirect Illocutionary Acts

Now that we have seen that an utterance can have more than one illocutionary, it is useful to introduce the distinction between direct and indirect illocutionary act.

Hurford & Heasley (1983:259) distinguished the illocutionary act which becomes direct illocutionary act and indirect illocutionary act. Direct illocutionary
as the illocutionary most directly indicated by a literal reading of the grammatical form and vocabulary of the sentence uttered and indirect illocutionary as any further illocutionary the utterance may have.

*Direct illocutionary act* is an illocutionary act in which only the illocutionary force and propositional content literally expressed by the lexical items and syntactic form of the utterance are communicated. The direct illocutionary act of an utterance is the illocutionary most directly indicated by a literal reading of the grammatical form and vocabulary of the sentence uttered.

*Indirect illocutionary act* is an illocutionary act in which the speaker expresses another illocutionary force other than that literally expressed in the utterance, by relying on, shared background knowledge principles of conversation, such as the cooperative principle convention, and the ability of the addressee to make inferences. The indirect illocutionary act of an utterance is any further illocution the utterance may have. Let see some examples of direct and indirect illocutionary act bellow.

1. The direct illocutionary of, “Can you pass the salt, please?” is an enquiry about the hearer’s ability to pass the salt. The indirect illocutionary is a request that the hearer pass the salt.
2. “Why don’t we go to Portugal this summer?”
   The direct illocutionary of that statement is asking why speaker and hearer do not go to Portugal this summer. The indirect illocutionary is a suggesting that the speaker and the hearer go to Portugal this summer.
3. The direct illocutionary of, “Let me say immediately that I endorse the chairman’s ruling” is an ordering hearer to permit speaker to say that
he/she endorses the chairman’s ruling. The indirect illocutionary is an endorsing chairman’s ruling.

4. “I believe you may have been looking for me.” The direct illocutionary is asserting that speaker believes hearer may have been looking for speaker, and the indirect illocutionary is asking whether hearer has been looking for speaker.

The direct illocution of, “I must ask you to leave” is an asserting that speaker is obliged to ask hearer to leave, and the indirect illocution is asking hearer to leave.

2.2.3 Perlocutionary Act

The perlocutionary acts are speech acts that carried out by a speaker making an utterance as the act of causing a certain effect on the hearer and others.

Perlocutionary acts are speech acts that have an effect on the feelings, thoughts or actions of either the speaker or the listener. In other words, they seek to change minds!

If A says, “There’s a hornet in your left ear”, it may well cause B to panic, scream and scratch wildly at your ear. Causing these emotions and actions of B is the perlocutionary act of A’s utterance.

The perlocutionary act of an utterance is the causing of a change to be brought about, perhaps unintentionally, through, or by means of the utterance. The point of carefully distinguishing the perlocutionary act aspect of the speech act from others is that perlocutions can often be accidental, and thus bear a relatively unsystematic relationship to any classification of sentence types.
Unlike locutionary acts, perlocutionary acts are external to the performance. For example, inspiring, persuading, and deterring. Speaker's perlocutionary act is an act of achieving a particular perlocutionary effect on hearer as a result of hearer recognizing (what he/she takes to be) the locution and illocutionary forces in utterance.

So, a perlocutionary is hearer's behavioural response to the meaning of utterance—not necessarily a physical or verbal response, perhaps merely a mental or emotional response of some kinds. Other perlocutionary acts are such things as: alerting hearer by warning hearer of danger; persuading hearer to an opinion by stating supporting facts; intimidating hearer by threatening; getting hearer to do something by means of a suggestion, a hint, a request, or a command; and so forth. An effect of utterance which does not result from hearer recognizing the locution and illocutionary point of utterance is not a perlocutionary effect, but some kinds of gestural effect (e.g. responding to a raised voice or an angry look). Perlocutionary acts are extremely significant within a theory of communication because the normal reason for speaking is to cause an effect in hearer, and speaker typically strives to achieve this by any means he/she can. However, perlocutionary effects fall beyond the boundary of linguistics because they are not part of language but behavioural and/or cognitive and/or emotional responses to the illocutions in utterances. What linguists can properly look at, however, are the intentions of speakers to bring about certain perlocutionary effects: Speaker's intention to cause a perlocutionary effect on hearer by having hearer recognize the illocutionary forces in speaker's utterance is variously referred to as

### 2.3 Previous Study

Previous study is put in this research because this analysis needs input of the related study as considerations in order to enrich the writer’s analysis.

Wahyuni (2008:68) in her thesis *Expressive Illocutionary Acts in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park*, says that expressive illocutionary acts which express the psychological state of the speaker through the utterances are applied in this novel (*Mansfield Park*) and the categories of expressive illocutionary acts are thanking, apologizing, congratulating, wishing, and criticizing/complaining.

Sitorus (2004:48) in her thesis *Commissive Illocutionary Acts on Charles Dickens’ novel ‘Hard Time’* concludes that indirect commissive illocutionary acts found in Charles Dickens’ novel entitled *Hard Time*, but they are not identified through volitional verb as paradigmatic of commissive. It can be identified through modal which can express future course of action by using *will, shall, be going to*, and future conditional as *would have*. There are some paradigmatics of commissive as *promise, offer, commit, threaten, envisage, agree, volunteer, and guarantee*.

Rahmawati (2004:40) in her thesis *An Analysis of Illocutionary Acts on Elizabeth Bergs’ novel Talk before Sleep* found that the way of performing illocutionary acts is dominated by the literal direct act, followed by literal direct act associated with non-literal indirect act, and then non-literal direct act, followed by literal direct act associated with literal indirect act. The dominant types of
Illocutionary act are representatives and directives, and then followed by rogative, expressive, commissive, and declaratives.

Siregar (2010:96) in his thesis *Illocutionary Act in the Movie A walk to Remember* that discussed about illocutionary act found out categories of illocutionary act, representative (41.56%), rogative (24.75%), directive (18.43%), expressive (12.5%), commissive (3.15%), and no declarative.

Based on the some previous studies described above, it can be concluded that the common categories of expressive illocutionary acts that happened are thanking, apologizing, congratulating, wishing, and criticizing/complaining. The common categories of commissive illocutionary acts are promising, offering, committing, threatening, envisaging, agreeing, volunteering, and guarantying.